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NOTES AND COMMENTS

federal government between 1905 and 1907 the offense would have been
justifiable in the criminal courts of this state.
That sections 104-1 and 104-7 of our General Statutes are in conflict is recognized by the court in the principal case. However, since
these statutes are prospective only, and since it must be recognized that
jurisdiction over lands once ceded cannot be limited at a later date,
such a situation seems inescapable.
It appears clear that while the act of 1907 remains in effect the
court will be forced to admit lack of jurisdiction over lands acquired
before 1905 or after 1907. The writer would agree that the principal
case is a lucid example of the undesirable result which the application
of this statute requires the court to reach.
Therefore, it is submitted that the legislature of North Carolina
enact into law a provision reserving to the courts of this state concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts over violations of our criminal
laws occurring on such tracts of land hereafter acquired. It is clear that
in special cases where conditions exist for removal to federal courts the
federal judiciary will have jurisdiction over the cause, regardless of
whether it may accrue from occurrences taking place on lands privately
owned or owned by the state or federal governments. Therefore, the
reservation of concurrent jurisdiction over those indicted for crimes in
violation of our criminal laws would not create inconsistencies with the
purposes for which the land is acquired by the federal government, and
would facilitate the speedy adjudication of the ordinary cases arising
10
from the relations of inhabitants of the community.
CHARLts F. CoiA, JR.
Mortgages and Security Trust Deeds-Sale Undet Power-Burden of
Proof as to Regularity-Recital in Trustee's Deed
The dissent of Barnhill, J. in Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v..
Boogher' charges the majority (Stacy, C. J., not participating) with
overthrowing sub silentio a well established and long followed rule in
this state as to burden of proving proper advertisement of a foreclosure2 *"
sale when the trustee's deed contains a recital of advertisement duly
made. The facts were these: on default in payment of money loaned
defendants by plaintiff insurance company and secured by a trust deed
of real property, the trustee advertised and sold the security to plain10 For a general discussion of jurisdiction over federal lands within the state
see Note (1929) 8 N. C. L. Rxv. 299.
1224 N. C. 563, 31 S. E. (2d) 771 (1944).
',The word "foreclosure" is for convenience used herein to include sales under
a power granted in the security instrument whether trust deed or mortgage, and
the words "mortgage' and "mortagor" are also used in a correspondingly enlarged
and somewhat inaccurate sense where it seems to make no difference.
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tiff,3* giving him a deed which recited that "after due advertisement
as in said (trust) deed prescribed and by law provided, the said ...
trustee ... did expose to public sale . . , etc." Defendants thereafter
refused to vacate, and plaintiff purchaser now sues to oust them.
The defense was that the advertisement had not been published as
required and recited, that the sale was accordingly void and plaintiff
acquired no title.4* It was apparently conceded that there must be
strict compliance with provisions for notice before a valid sale could
take place. 5* No point was made that the recital itself was not specific
enough or that it stated a mere conclusion and not the facts,0 but only
that the recital was not true. Some one of several required postings, it
was claimed, had not been made.
On this issue of fact the trial judge squarely put the burden on the
defendant mortgagor (trustor), and he did so without any apparent
reference to the recitals.
The supreme court, while granting the recitals some force as evidence for plaintiff, held that the burden of proof was on plaintiff
throughout and the instruction below was error.
In coming to this decision the opinion of the court premises a state', Purchase by the creditor (beneficiary under the trust deed) at the sale
conducted by the "independent" trustee is not rendered invalid by the doctrine
which bars a mortgagee from conclusively purchasing at his own sale no matter
how well advertised or honestly conducted. Peedin v. Oliver, 222 N. C. 665, 24
S. E. (2d) 519 (1943); Phipps v. Wyatt, 199 N. C. 727, 155 S. E. 721 (1930).
Cf. Whitehead v. Hellen, 76 N. C. 99 (1877), per Pearson, C. 5. (mortgagee
buys through agent); Taylor v. Heggie, 83 N. C. 244 (1880). But a voidable
title is acquired which may become absolute on the mortgagor's acquiescence or
his non-action for ten years. Jones v. Pullen, 115 N. C. 465, 20 S. E. 624 (1894).
Pueblo R. E. Loan & Inv. Co. v. Johnson, 342 Mo. 991, 119 S. W. (2d) 274
(1938), similar. Whether the principal doctrine itself is wise has been doubted.
WALSH, MORTGAGES (1934) 349; Note (1940) 18 N. C. L. Rev. 350, 354. And see
Goenen v. Schroeder, 18 Minn. 66 (1871). But the exception first mentioned in
favor of purchase by the secured creditor when the sale is by a trustee seems
unrealistic, for, notwithstanding the remark in McLawhorn v. Harris, 156 N. C.
107, 110, 72 S. E. 211, 212 (1911), that the trustee is "appointed by the mortgagors," the fact is that he is often, perhaps generally, named by and is generally
friendly to the creditor. And see Brown v. Jennings, 188 N. C. 155, 161, 124 S. E.
150, 153 (1924), to the effect that the trustee's duty is "primarily" to the creditor.
'* This extreme contention has been held untenable since the trustee holds the
legal title and can pass it subject to the same trusts. Lunsford v. Speaks, 112
N. C. 608, 17 S. E. 430 (1893) ; followed in Brett v. Davenport, 151 N. C. 56, 59,
65 S. E. 611, 612 (1909) ; Savings & Loan Assn. v. Deering, 66 Cal. 291, 5 Pac.
.353 (1885). Cf., Savings & Loan Assn. v. Burnett, 106 Cal. 514, 37 Pac. 180
(1894).
* As held in Lunsford v. Speaks, 112 N. C. 608, 17 S. E. 430 (1893) ; Ferebee
v. Sawyer, 167 N. C. 199, 201, 83 S. E. 17, 18 (1914), per Hoke, C. J.; Brown
v. Jennings, 188 N. C. 155, 160, 124 S. E. 150, 153 (1924). Cf. Ivrey v. Karr,
Md. -,
34 A. (2d) 847, 853 (1943), slight misdescription of lots corrected
by announcement at sale, no prejudice shown; Douglas v. Rhodes, 188 N. C. 580,
125 S. E. 261 (1924), statute re description. The sale must be in accord with
the notice. Sale by parcels unwarranted where notice was of a sale in gross.
Hahn v. Pindell, 64 Ky. 538, 541 (1867).
8 Sometimes contended.
See Sorensen v. Hall, 219 Cal. 680, 28 P. (2d) 667
(1923). Cf. recitals in Berry v. Boomer, 180 N. C. 67, 103 S. E. 914 (1920).
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ment that, "the recitals ... are prima facie evidence of the correctness
of the facts therein set forth; and the burden of proving otherwise is on
the person attacking the sale

....

"

(citing Dillingham v. Gardner

wherein substantially identical language is found).
The first part of this sentence, that about prima facie evidence,
sounds consistent with the holding that was made, i.e., burden on the
grantee in the deed to prove the truth of the fact recited, the recital
itself merely saving him from nonsuit if he offered no other evidence.
The last of the sentence, however, sounds as if it put the burden of
proof, i.e., of finally convincing the jury that the recital was false, upon
him who disputes it. In fact, that is literally what it says. Further
elaboration shows that the burden meant is not the burden of ultimate
proof but the burden of going forward with evidence to offset the prina
facie case the recital has made for the deed holder. So explained, the
seemingly contradictory statement is not likely to confuseS* But in
the Dillingham case, the only one cited in the opinion, that explanatory
elaboration was not added; it is thus understandable why the dissenting
judge uses the majority's sole citation as one of several authorities for
his opposing position. The Dillingham case is found in turn to have
relied solely on a case wherein Clark, C. J., declared that recitals are
prima f acie evidence of the fact. 9 So far as mere form of statement is
concerned, that remark is support for the actual holding in the instant
case; and, if that were all there was to it, we might dismiss the matter
by observing that the dissent here was mistaken and should only have
raised objection to some of the language of the majority opinion and
not to the decision.
But that is not all there is to it and the dissent was not mistaken.
In many of the North Carolina cases where the subject was broached
there was, it is true, no square decision on the real question of burden of
proof as to facts recited because either the matter was not in issue or
because other factors controlled the result. Thus it has been held that
where a mortgagor waives his right to object tb irregularities in the
notice or the sale, or is estopped, as perhaps he might be by attending
7219 N. C. 227, 13 S. E. (2d) 478 (1941).
" That is, the transfer of the burden of proof from attacker to proponent of
the deed is a simple and understandable change and the fact that the burden on
the attacker is now something other and less than it used to be is simple. But the
exact nature of his new burden is another matter. There appear to be at least
five possible rules as to the effect to be given evidence which creates a presumption.
See MoDEL CODE OF EvmE~ca, Am. L. Inst. (1942), Ch. 8, Presumptions, 309-312
and Rule 704. The phrase prima facie evidence is not there used but it is comprehended in the situations presented as one class of presumption. See 9 WIGMORE, EVMENCE (3d ed. 1940) §2494. A vast and discordant literature on this
subject belies any simplicity if it does not demonstrate the futility of most of the
rules as a proper part of a system of handling trials. This angle of the matter
is touched upon later herein.
' Brewington v. Hargrove, 178 N. C. 143, 145, 100 S. E. 308, 309 (1919).
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the sale and raising no objection, he loses his case and .his property
without regard to burden of proof as to recited facts in the dleed. 1° *
Or where the property has later been sold to a bona fide purchaser, the
recitals may become conclusive, and no rule as to burden of proof in
regard thereto has any bearing."l*
.It is also true that in several of these cases, as in some of the cases
from other courts, there is a singularly indiscriminate use of the terms
prima facie evidence, presumption and ,burden of proof,' 2 usually without any disclosure of what instructions were given below. All of which
taken together sheds little light on the specific matter in hand. But,
notwithstanding the presence of complicating factors and murky language which obscures the holding in many cases, it is still true, as the
dissent asserted, that in North Carolina we have in the past put the
burden where the trial judge here put it and got reversed for doing.
In Lunsford v. Spea.ks' 3 about half a century ago the trial court
had instructed the jury "that the burden was upon the plaintiff (purchaser) to show that the power of sale contained in the mortgage had
14
been complied with, and, having failed to do so, he could not recover." *
10* Lunsford v. Speaks, 112 N. C. 608, 614, 17 S. E. 430, 431 (1893) semble,
citing Olcutt v. Bynum, 17 Wall. 44, 21 L. ed. 70 (U. S. 1872), in which case,
however, the mortgagor waited several years to protest the sale and then did so
on the ground of alleged defects in the manner of sale which he was aware of all
the time. In most other cases of acquiescence, waiver, or estoppel the facts were
similarly known to the mortagor. Carroll v. Hutton, 91 Md. 379, 46 Atd. 967
(1900); Fox v. Jacobs, 289 Mich. 619, 286 N. W. 854 (1939); Hill v. Albemarle
Fert. Co., 210 N. C. 417, 421, 187 S.E. 577, 579 (1936); Dennis v. Dixon, 209
N. C. 199, 202, 183 S. E. 360, 361 (1935); Brewington v. Hargrove, 178 N. C.
143, 145, 100 S.E. 308, 309 (1919); Norwood v. Lassiter, 132 N. C. 53, 58, 59,
43 S. E. 509, 510-511 (1903) ; Lamb v. Goodwin, 32 N. C. 320 (1849). And see
Woods v. Klein, 223 Pa. 256, 72 At. 523, 525 (1909). Cf. Murphy v. May, 243
Ala. 66, 8 So. (2d) 442 (1942). And cf. where mortgagor did not know the facts
and was held not estopped, Burnett v. Dunn Comm. & Supply Co., 180 N. C. 117,
119, 104 S.E. 137, 138 (1920) ; Eubanks v. Becton, 158 N. C. 231, 237, 73 S.E.
1009, 1012 (1912). The mortgagor might well be ignorant of defects in advertising. See infra, note 28. Reference in this footnote is to estoppel from conduct
or inaction of the mortgagor and not to an estoppel from the recitals themselves (31
C. J. S.215) on the theory that they were made by the mortgagor himself through
his representative. See note 3 supra. And see discussion as to whose the recitals
really are. Union Bk. & Tr. Co. v. Royall, 226 Ala. 670, 148 So. 399 (1933).
1*Elkes
v. Interstate Trustee Corp., 209 N. C. 832, 187 S.E. 572 (1936),
(admitted); Phipps v. Wyatt, 199 N. C. 727, 155 S.E. 721 (1930); Brewington
v. Hargrove, 178 N. C. 143, 146, 100 S.E. 308, 310 (1919) ; Hinton v. Hall, 166
N. C. 477, 480, 82 S.E. 847, 848 (1914). In Brown v. Sheets, et al., 197 N. C.
268; 272, 148 S.E. 233, 235 (1929), a purchaser with notice took a clear title by
his purchase from a prior purchaser who was without notice. Headnote No. 3
is believed to be in error in stating that a bona fide purchaser at the foreclosure
sale is likewise protected.
2See among others, Clark v. Wommack, 192 Ark. 895, 95 S. W. (2d) 891
(1936) ; Melchor v. Casey, 173 Miss. 67, 161 So. 692 (1935) ; Phipps v. Wyatt,
199 N. C. 727, 731, 155 S. E. 721, 723 (1930); Br6wn v. Sheets, 197 N. C. 268,
148 S.E. 233 (1929) (Trial judge sits without jury.) ; Berry v. Boomer et al.,
180 N. C. 67, 103 S.E. 914 (1920). Where delivery of deed is in question, see
Wolf v. Wolf, 59 S.D. 418, 240 N. W. 349 (1932).
18112 N. C. 608, 17 S.E. 430 (1893).
4* The trial court not only announced to the jury that the burden was as above
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The supreme court reversed, after noting a conflict of authority elsewhere. It spoke of the title shown by plaintiff as being prima face,
and "based upon the general presumption in favor of meritorious parties
as purchasers for value that the power has been properly exercised." 1S*
This language taken alone sounds in accord with the instant case. But
at the outset the court stated the principal question to be "whether the
burden is on the plaintiff to show that the power of sale has been duly
exercised." The trial court had said it was and the supreme court said
it was not, and that without reference to recitals. Whatever uncertainties might be thought to exist because of the equivocal language of
the opinion, the trial courts were warranted in understanding that thereafter they should instruct juries that the burden was on the one contesting the validity of the sale and deed given under it. Later one trial
judge seems to have acted on that understanding and to have received
terse and emphatic supreme court approval of his action. "Was it
error in his Honor to charge that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show that the land was not properly advertised for sale under
said mortgage?" This question "is decided against the contention of
the plaintiff... in Lunsford v. Speaks!" *
Granted then that the rule heretofore followed in,this state has
been changed by the present decision and that the change has brought
North Carolina into line with what is probably the majority rule elsewhere, 17* two questions remain. First, as a result of the new rule,
stated but instructed them that since the purchaser had failed to show that the
power of sale had been complied with, they should find the first issue, "No." Had
the judge been held correct on the location of the burden his binding instruction
for the defendant would have been unexceptionable.
* "Meritorious" persons here seem to be those without knowledge of defects,
i.e., bona fide purchasers. But the immediate purchaser is not treated as a bona
fide purchaser as that term is usually used. See comment on a mistaken headnote
in footnote 11, supra.
"* Troxler v. Gant, 173 N. C. 422, 425, 92 S. E. 152, 153 (1917), also citing
for the same point, Cawfield v. Owens, 129 N. C. 288, 40 S. E. 62 (1901), whose
language perhaps supports the decision although it is not clear there what instruction, if any, the trial judge gave the jury on burden of proof, the defendant not
having introduced any evidence of defective notice. In Brewington v. Hargrove,
178 N. C. 143, 100 S. E. 308 (1919), "the court properly refused to instruct the
jury that the burden was upon the plaintiff to show that the land was advertised
by notice published at the courthouse door and in three other public places," but
as plaintiff was a subsequent purchaser this would appear immaterial. In Little
v. Harrison, 209 N. C. 360, 183 S. E. 293 (1936) "the burden being upon the
plaintiffs to establish the failure to properly advertise, the judgment for nonsuit
was correctly entered," although the plaintiff mortgagor had offered some evidence, considered insufficient, to show defective advertising. Herein occurs also
the same language as that so often used, that recitals are prima facie evidence and'
the burden (what burden?) is on the mortgagor to show improper advertisement.
Cf. Edwards v. Hair, 215 N. C. 662, 2 S. E. (2d) 859 (1939), where the burden
of proof was held to be on the mortgagor who claimed that foreclosure was after
the statute of limitations had run. See also Price v. Reeves, 91 S. W. (2d) 862,
865 (Ft. W. Ct. App., Tex., 1936).
m, Cleveland v. Bateman, 21 N. M. 675. 695, 158 Pac. 648, 654 (1916) ; Crabtree v. Price, 212 Ala. 387, 102 So. 605 (1924) ; Horton v. Little, 176 Ala. 267, 57
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what does the trial judge now do? And second, is the change a desirable one? As to the first of these questions, much has been written
(and not all of it harmonious) on the general subject of prima facie
evidence, presumptions and burden of proof.' s The intricacy and confusion staggers the reader, often perhaps the writer. Within the limits
of this note it could not be hoped to answer the first question adequately; but for some light on the present application of the doctrine we
turn to the principal opinion itself and undertake with not too great
assurance to elaborate.
"The defendants," said the court, "had a right to introduce evidence
to rebut the prima facie case made out by the recitals in the trustee's
deed or to decline to -introduce evidence and thereby assume the risk
of an adverse verdict on plaintiff's evidence. The most that a prima,
facie case does, when made out, is to warrant but not to compel a verdict." It seems clear under this and succeeding portions of the opinion
that when the trustee's deed with its recital of proper advertising had
been introduced, the grantee, notwithstanding his having the burden of
proof, might rest without risk of nonsuit or of a directed verdict for the
attacker at that point. In other words, absent opposing evidence, the
judge would then send the case to the jury presumably with the statement that they might find the recital to be true and the recited events
to have taken place (but not that they must so find).19* If, then, they
So. 851 (1911); McSwain v. Young, 111 Miss. 688, 72 So. 129(1) (1916), but

here the purchaser's own additional evidence rebutted the presumption; Dryden,
Admr. v. Stephens, 19 W. Va. 1, 14-17 (1881) (involved subsequent purchaser)
-riticizing dictum in Gibson's Heirs v. Jones, 5 Leigh 370 (Va. 1834) ; Burke v.
Adair, 23 W. Va. 139, 160 (1883). Tartt v. Clayton, 109 II. 579, 585 (1884)
seems in accord although the opinion like that in the instant case speaks both of
prima facie evidence from recitals and burden of proof on the attacker, and there
the appeal was from a judge sitting in equity. The matter is not later clarified
in that state because only sale under judicial proceedings has been lawful there
for many years. But evidently that system did not prove satisfactory. See Note
(1940) 8 U. Cm. L. REv. 90. See generally but not over helpfully, 3 JoNEs,
MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) §§2370, 2437; I DEvLix, DEEDS (3d ed. 1911) §425; 2
WILTSIE, MORTGAGE FORECLOSuRE (5th ed., 1939) §§895, 898; 41 C. J., Mortgages
§1449; 37 Am. JuR., Mortgages, §710. Cf. Niles v. Ransford, 1 Mich. 338, 341
(1849) ("The person so foreclosing must see to it that he in all material matters
keeps within the powers given to him, for there are no legal presumptions or
intendments raised by the law to support his proceedings, as there might be if the
sale was made pursuant to a decree and order of a court of chancery.") ; Wehrum
v. Wehrum, 179 App. Div. 814, 167 N. Y. S. 295, 297 (1st Dep't 1917).
" See e.g., 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed., 1940) §§2483-2540; Morgan, Tech-

nique in the Use of Presumptions, (1939) 24 IowA L. REV. 413; McCormick,
Charges on Presumptions and Burden of Proof, (1927) 5 N. C. L. REv. 289;
Markham, Why a Burden of Going Forward? (1937) 16 N. C. L. REv. 12.
"-*Although compare language of Nash, J. in State v. Floyd, 35 N. C. 382,
386 (1852) quoted in McCormick, Charges on Presumptions, (1927) 5 N. C. L.
REV. 289, 294; also language quoted in the instant case from Brock v. Metropolitan
L. Ins. Co., 156 N. C. 112, 116, 72 S. E. 213, 215 (1911), that "the prima facie
case is only evidence, stronger, to be.sure, than ordinary proof .. ." (Italics mine).
This, taken alone, would suggest that 'a verdict should be directed for the proponent in absence of any rebutting evidence. And see note 23, infra.
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did so find, it would mean that the grantee would have carried his burden of convincing them by the same facts which, serving as a prima
facie case, got him to the jury in the first place. If, after the grantee
rested as above, the attacker offered some evidence tending to throw
doubt on the truth of the recitals but not so "clear and convincing" as
to call for a directed verdict in his favor, the trial judge would let the
jury know that they must be finally persuaded that the facts recited had
taken place and that they might consider the fact that they were so recited 2° * as well as the testimony contra (e.g., that a witness recalled
seeing no notice posted on a certain store door although he traded there
regularly throughout the period) in coming to their verdict.
From the above, it appears that we have not only abandoned the old
doctrine that the burden of finally persuading the jury was on the attacker of the deed, but we have swung past an intermediate position
suggested by the language of some cases, that proof of a deed with recitals created a presumption of the happening of the recited events
which the attacker must dislodge by the greater weight of his evidence,
a position sometimes known as the "Pennsylvania rule." 2 1 It is definitely excluded by the present opinion as it is by Wigmore in the slogan,
2
"the burden of proof never shifts."12
In our transition we may even have swung by another intermediate position less positive than the Pennsylvania rule, that of giving
to the prima facie case the force of conclusiveness in the absence of any
evidence by the mortgagor. 23* If the deed with recitals is introduced
and proved genuine and both parties then rest, the trial judge now
should apparently not instruct the jury to find for the plaintiff or possibly not even to find for plaintiff if they believe the evidence, but only
to find for the plaintiff if they believe from the evidence, including the
24
trustee's recitals, that the sale was duly advertised. *
2* To go further than this and include any instruction to the effect that the recitals created a prima facie case or a presumption of the happening of the events
would be to run the risk of error. See McCormick, Charges on Presumption and
Burden of Proof (1927) 5 N. C. L. REv. 289, 299-300.
"l MoDE CODE OF EVIDENcE, Am. L. Inst. (1942) 311.
"3 9 WIGMORE,EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §2489.
*As we seem to have done in several trustee deed cases heretofore. Elkes
v. Interstate Trustee Corp., 209 N. C. 832, 184 S. E. 826 (1936), nonsuit of mortgagor who offered no evidence; Little v. Harrison, 209 N. C. 360, 183 S. E. 293
(1936), same where insufficient evidence; Biggs v. Oxendine, 207 N. C. 601, 178
S. E. 216 (1935), verdict directed for purchaser where no evidence to rebut presumption of regularity in sale. The record on appeal in Dillingham v. Gardner,
219 N. C. 227, 13 S. E. 478 (1941), seems to show the same doctrine was applied
there also. Accord, Crabtree v. Price, 212 Ala. 387, 102 So. 605 (1924) ; Clark
v. Womack, 195 Ark. 895, 95 S. W. (2d) 891 (1936) ; Cleveland v. Bateman, 21

N. M. 675, 158 Pac. 648 (1916).

2'*The last part of this sentence contradicts, of course, the cases in footnote
23 and would seem to give to the presumption only the weight of an inference
(see Note (1943) 17 So. CAL. L. REv. 48, 50) such as e.g. in res ipsa cases (see
Note (1941) 19 N. C. L. REV. 617, 620). The statement is based on language above
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That brings us to the final question: Is the change a desirable one?
On the whole it is believed not. The contest is commonly between the
mortgagor and the immediate purchaser. A purchaser is usually expected to investigate the title to land he buys and to take subject to
defects which a reasonable investigation would disclose. 25 But it may
be a different thing to say that he should tramp about the community to
see if notice of a trustee's sale had been tacked up "at Holshouser's
Store" and, what is worse, to assure himself that it was tacked up there
thirty days previous and not removed after posting for any time during
the required interim or take the risk of a contrary jury verdict on that
matter.2 6* The mortgagor is interested in holding his property. It
may not be asking too much of him to require him to do the walking
and the looking and to raise objections at the sale if objections are in
order.
But this line of argument proves too much. It would not only put
the burden on the mortgagor to prove that the preliminaries were not
proper. It would make the sale conclusive against him unless he appeared and gave notice of the deficiencies in advertising. It would go
further even than the estoppel earlier mentioned which might arise if
he attended the sale and offered no protest.27

It would require him to

come and protest. Considering that North Carolina, in line with most
quoted from the opinion that the attacker might decline to introduce and take the
risk of an adverse verdict. If the trial judge could direct outright for the proponent, there would seem to be not just a risk but a certainty of an adverse verdict. And this would be true even should the judge's charge be, "If you believe
the evidence you should find for the proponent" (on this issue), since, absent a
claim of forgery, there could be no room for disbelieving that the recitals were
made.
The statement in the text is also based on the remaining language quoted, that
even when a prima facie case is made out it only warrants but does not compel a
verdict. That the distinction between warranting and compelling a verdict is not
always definitely present to the mind of the judges, compare the language of
Walker, J., in Winslow v. Norfolk Hardwood Co., 147 N. C. 275, 277, 60 S. E.
1130, 1131 (1908), "takes the chance of an adverse verdict," with language from
Elliott on Contracts quoted by the judge a few lines later in the same paragraph,
"when the actor has . . made a prima facie case, the other party is compelled in
turn to go forward or lose his case." (Italics mine.)
It must be admitted that the general rule gives to a presumption based on believed facts (often referred to as a prima facie case) the effect of conclusiveness
when no opposing evidence is introduced, 9 WiGomRE, op. cit. §2491. And the
statement often made that a presumption has no force as evidence means that it
has no such artificial force as against actual opposing evidence. The fact which
gives rise to the presumption continues to have for the jury its normal persuasive
force. In the language of Wigmore in the section just cited, "they (the jury)
may estimate it for just such intrinsic effect as it seems to have under all the
circumstances."
Hinton v. Hall, 166 N. C. 477, 480, 82 S. E. 847, 848 (1914).
H
-'*
Although see Campbell, J. in a very lucid opinion, Graham v. Fitts, 53
Miss. 307, 313 (1876), that if a sale were to be invalidated by the acts of mischievous people in pulling down notices "titles would be so insecure under it as to
forbid competition at such sales and lead to the sacrifice of property." And see
Pac. States Say. & Loan Co. v. O'Neill, 7 Cal. (2d) 596, 61 P. (2d) 1160 (1936).
,2 Supra, text at footnote 10.
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269

states, does not require special notice to the mortgagor or his privies, 28 *
this would seem to be an unwarranted hardship. In some mortgages it
has been provided that recitals in a trustee's deed should be conclusive
on the mortgagor, but it is doubtful if full effect would be given to this
severe provision.2 9 Of course, mortgagors as a class stand to benefit
by higher bids and bidders are encouraged to go up by rules which
diminish the possible defects of titles they acquire at foreclosure sales
and reduce the burden of later proving their validity. 3° * The rule we
have just abandoned and the one we now adopt, both give the buyer
some assistance in sustaining his title. But while the assurance provided buyers by our former rule was real and substantial, that under
the instant case is negligible. If the difference were well understood,
it is quite likely that some future bidding would be chilled by this de2*Craig v. Price, 210 N. C. 739, 188 S. E. 321 (1936); Biggs v. Oxendine,
207 N. C. 601, 178 S. E. 216 (1935); 41 C. 3. Mortgages, §§1397-1399. The Model
Power of Sale Mortgage ForeclosureAct, §3(1) (d), (e), HANDBOOK, NAT'L CONF.
COM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, (1940) 258, provides for notice to both the
mortgagor and occupant, and for recording affidavits of due notice given. Id. §7.
Though, except as to subsequent bona fide purchasers, it makes the certificate of
sale only prima facie evidence of compliance with requirements of law. Id. §54.
See also note, Proposed Illinois Legislation Providing for Foreclosure of Mortgages by Means of Power of Sale, (1940) 8 U. CHI. L. REv. 90, 92. It may be
that the best solution of the problem would be to require notice to all such interested parties and then cut off their rights to upset the sale for irregularities
in advertising, etc., after a specified reasonable period. See PATTON, LAND TITLES
(1938) §234 at page 765, footnote 251, urging a procedure in court following sale
to settle the validity of the sale. (Citing statutes of Maryland and Minnesota.)
And see, interpreting a statute which requires mortgagor to be named in advertisement for foreclosure, Melchor v. Casey, 173 Miss. 67, 161 So. 692 (1935).
"This provision seemingly common in the Far West appears not to have been
generally given full effect in the cases even in that area. Zadar v. Duke, 212
Cal. 621, 299 Pac. 524 (1931) ; Seidell v. Tuxedo Land Co., 1 Cal. App. 406, 36
P. (2d) 1102 (1934). Cf., Pacific States Say. & Loan Co. v. O'Neill, 7 Cal. (2d)
596, 61 P. (2d) 1162 (1936) (conclusive except where mortgagors entitled to
equitable relief) ; Holland v. Pendleton Mtge. Co., 61 Cal. App. (2d) 570, 143 P.
(2d) 493, 496 (1943).
An English variant is a provision in the mortgage that the purchaser shall not
have to see that the stipulated notice (to the mortgagor) has been given. Held,
however, no protection to one with knowledge of the want of such notice. Parkinson v. Hanbury, 1 Dr. & Sm. 143, 62 Eng. Rep. 332 .(Ch. 1860). See Annotation
(1917) 31 D. L.R. 300, 301.
It is often provided that the recitals shall be prima facie evidence of what they
state. Scott v. Lambert, 24 Colo. App. 260, 132 Pac. 1145 (1913) ; Melchor v.
Casey, 173 Miss. 67, 161 So. 692 (1935); Phipps v. Wyatt, 199 N. C. 727, 155
S. E. 721 (1930). This adds nothing to their force in most states. Scott v.
Lambert and Melchor v. Casey, both supra. Statutes sometimes enact some similar rule. Petring v. Kuhs, 350 Mo. 1197, 171 S. W. (2d) 653 (1943) ("Prima facie
evidence of their truth." Court says evidence to rebut must be "clear and satisfactory," and from what follows it appears that it must be more than a mere
preponderance. This sounds like putting the ultimate burden of proof on the
mortgagor and then some !); Ashworth v. Cole, 180 Va. 108, 21 S. E. (2d) 7.78
(1942). See Miller v. Shaw, 103 Ill. 277, 285-286 (1882) (May refer to evidential
effect of abstract rather than recitals as headnote states); Deutsch v. Haab. 135
App. Div. 756, 119 N. Y. Supp. 911 (2d Dep't 1909) (Construing statute by which
affidavits relative to notice, etc., are made "presumptive evidence of the matter
of fact stated.").
So*On the other hand, theoretically at least, carrying out requirements relative
to advertising and notice will be likely to get more people out.
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cision; but, considering the nebulous understanding which must be
generally assumed of a legal rule which has been the subject of such
foggy judicial treatment, it is not imagined that the change will have
any early appreciable effect on the foreclosure market. And this is the
more patently true where, as in the instant case, the creditor is himself
bidding in the security for the amount of the debt.
It has been noted that some of the cases were decided without regard to any recitals of proper advertisement.3 1 It is not apparent what
would have been decided in the instant case without this supporting
factor. It might easily be held that a deed from a trustee even though
it contained no recital of due advertisement would be prima facie vidence of a valid sale and conveyance. That would give the deed alone
all the force given in the instant case to a -deed with the. usual recitals,
and that is probably as far as we should go for the unusual conveyance
not reciting proper advertisement 8 2* Recitals do, however, add some
measure of conviction. They may sometimes be erroneous. But less
often will they be fraudulent because most trustees are not likely to
make deliberately false statements.
That belief may argue for putting the burden in case of proved
recitals back where it used to be in North Carolina, on the one disputing them, thus in effect making the claim of improper advertising an
affirmative 'defense. Recognizing that this is a matter on which different
views are understandable, it is believed that is where the burden should
be even in case of a purchaser who was the secured creditor as was the
present plaintiff.
Negligence-Tort Liability of Public Employees
In a recent North Carolina case,' the defendants, employees of the
North Carolina State Highway Commission, were held subject to personal liability for their negligence in operating a road sweeper so as to
damage the goods of the plaintiff. Though three justices dissented as
to the question of the negligence of the defendants, only one justice dissented as to the question of the immunity of the defendants because of
" Elkes v. Interstate Trustee Corp., 209 N. C. 832, 187 S. E. 572 (1936);
Brown v. Sheets, 197 N. C. 268, 148 S. E. 233 (1929); Cawfield v. Owens, 129
N. C. 286, 40 S. E. 62 (1901); Lunsford v. Speaks, 112 N. C. 608, 17 S. E. 430

(1893) ; Dewberry v. Bk. of Standing Rock, 227 Ala. 484, 150 So. 463 (1933) ;
Graham v. Fitts, 53 Miss. 307 (1876). Similar general statement as to presumption of regularity in exercise of power of sale, Bachrach v. Washington United
Coop.,

-

Md. -

, 29 A. (2d) 822, 825 (1943).

"*Lunsford v. Speaks, supra, note 31, seems, however, to have given more
probative effect to a non-reciting deed than the present decision gives to one with
recitals. The same is probably true of several others of the cases cited in that
note. See also Arey Brick & Lbr. Co. v. Waggoner, 198 N. C. 221, 151 S.E. 193
(1930), where fraud was claimed.
3Miller v. Jones, 224 N. C. 783, 32 S. E. (2d) 594 (1945).

